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ABSTRACT
Using the metaphor and actuality of the ‘everyday cyborg’, this article makes the case
that the law is ill-equipped to deal with challenges raised by the linking of the organic,
biological person with synthetic, inorganic parts and devices. For instance, should inter-
nal medical devices that keep the person alive be viewed as part of the person or mere
objects (or something else)? Is damage to neuro-prostheses (eg nervous system inte-
grated limb prostheses) personal injury or damage to property? Who ought to control/
own the software in implanted medical devices? And how should the law deal with risks
around third-party device access (including that of unauthorised access and hacking)?
We argue that satisfactorily answering such questions will likely require a re-analysis of
the conceptual and philosophical underpinnings of the law, as well as the law itself. To
demonstrate this, we examine the uncharted terrain which everyday cyborgs pose for
the law, looking in particular at ﬁve areas: (i) medical device regulation, safety, and
product liability; (ii) damage to devices and liability; (iii) data and privacy; (iv) security
and biohacking; and (v) intellectual property rights. The article highlights how advanc-
ing biotechnology continues to reveal, and prompts us to confront, lacunae within the
law. Our analysis calls particular attention to law’s boundary-work (how the law utilises
and incorporates supposed ontological and moral boundaries) and the challenges which
everyday cyborgs pose to this.
KEYWORDS: Medical devices and prostheses, Law’s boundary-work, Data and pri-
vacy, Biohacking, Law, regulation, and technology, Intellectual property rights
I . INTRODUCTION
Everyday cyborgs are all around us. They are persons with replacements and augmen-
tations ranging from the simple to the extraordinarily complex, for example, artiﬁcial
joint replacements, implanted devices such as pacemakers and the total artiﬁcial heart,
VC The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press.
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and limb prostheses. An increasing number of people in the UK and worldwide rely
on such medical devices to monitor their physiological function, deliver medication,
supplement the functioning of a body part, or replace missing body parts.1 Some of
these support a person’s bodily function. Others are aimed at restoring the body to its
normal function. Some may even enhance such functioning.2 In this article, we con-
tend that the law is ill-equipped to deal with questions and challenges raised by the
linking of the organic, biological person with synthetic, inorganic parts and devices.
For instance, should internal medical devices which keep the person alive be viewed
as part of the person or mere objects (or something else)? Is damage to neuro-
prostheses (e.g. nervous system integrated limb prostheses) personal injury or damage
to property? Who ought to control/own the software in implanted medical devices?
And how should the law deal with risks around third-party device access (including
that of unauthorised access and hacking)? Our aim is not to give fulsome answers to
such complex questions, but to begin to analyse the uncharted terrain that everyday
cyborgs pose for the law. As such, this article represents the ﬁrst sustained analysis of
the challenges wrought by everyday cyborgs across multiple areas of the law. In so
doing, it also reveals some of the problematic conceptual apparatus, which sits at the
very heart of law’s structure. The consequence of this, we will conclude, is that satis-
factorily answering questions such as those just set out will likely require a re-analysis
of the conceptual and philosophical underpinnings of the law, as well as the law itself.
In order to do this, in Section II, we discuss the idea of the everyday cyborg, outlin-
ing some of the technologies of the everyday cyborg and setting out in broad terms
the nature of the challenges they pose. In Section III, we identify and examine some
speciﬁc legal issues, focusing on ﬁve areas: (i) medical device regulation, safety, and
product liability; (ii) damage to devices and liability; (iii) data and privacy; (iv) secur-
ity and biohacking; and (v) intellectual property rights. This section highlights how
advancing biotechnology continues to reveal, and prompts us to confront, lacunae
within the law. Following that, in Section IV, we examine some of the conceptual and
normative implications identiﬁed in the previous section. In so doing, we call attention
to law’s boundary-work; that is, how the law utilises and incorporates supposed onto-
logical and moral boundaries, something which inﬂuences not only its approach to
speciﬁc problems, but also its underlying structure.
We will see throughout this article that everyday cyborgs and their technologies
are encompassed by diverse and indeed disparate areas of law. Many of the difﬁculties,
challenges, and gaps we identify have been given little explicit legal consideration up
until now. And even where the issues discussed shade into existing debate and legal
provisions (e.g. data protection and privacy), the era of smart prostheses and
implanted devices gives rise to novel dimensions. These arise, in particular, because of
the assemblage of integrated persons and integrated goods. As will become apparent,
everyday cyborgs are integrated persons; that is, the integration of the biological person
1 US Food & Drug Administration, ‘Medical Devices: Implants and Prosthetics’, available at <https://www.
fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/ImplantsandProsthetics/> accessed 2 October
2017.
2 C Camara, P Peris-Lopez and JE Tapiador, ‘Security and Privacy Issues in Implantable Medical Devices: A
Comprehensive Survey’ (2015) 55 Journal of Biomedical Informatics 272, 272.
2 • MEDICAL LAW REVIEW
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/medlaw/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/medlaw/fwy003/4903014
by guest
on 21 March 2018
with the technological. Any conceptual or legal difﬁculties in this respect are com-
pounded by the nature of the technologies themselves. Increasingly, these are what
can be called integrated goods; that is, devices which not only have a physical existence,
but which are also capable of running software and of collecting, analysing, and trans-
mitting data. Although integrated goods themselves are not a new thing (all com-
puters, e.g. are such goods), the assemblage of integrated persons and integrated
goods generates a level of conceptual and normative complexity that the law has not
hitherto had to deal with head on. This makes deeper analysis an imperative. Using
the metaphor and actuality of the ‘everyday cyborg’, this article takes an important
step in that direction.
I I . TECHNOLOGIES OF THE EVERYDAY CYBORG
Gill Haddow and colleagues view everyday cyborgs as persons who are ‘hybrid[s] of
machine and organism living in modern society’.3 They are ‘everyday’ cyborgs as dis-
tinct from the familiar and more extraordinary imagery of science ﬁction; for example,
Asimov’s Bicentennial Man or Seven of Nine and Locutus of the Borg from Star Trek.
They are ordinary persons with implantable medical devices. The image of the every-
day cyborg echoes Haraway’s famous ‘cyborg manifesto’ in which she describes a
cyborg as being ‘a creature of social reality as well as a creature of ﬁction’.4 Everyday
cyborgs are where the social reality of the present meets the science ﬁction of the
future, embodying—as they do—ever increasingly sophisticated technologies. As
such, Haddow and colleagues are mainly interested in persons with ‘smart’ technolo-
gies and not ‘implantable technologies of the “carpentry kind” such as hip or knee
joints, or other static prosthetics’.5 Their focus is on technologies, which broadly cor-
respond to the original meaning of the word ‘cyborg’ as ‘cybernetic organism’.6 As
such, they conceptualise everyday cyborgs as persons with implantable technologies
that involve a high degree of automation.7 In this vein, much of Haddow’s work on
everyday cyborgs focuses on people with internal cardioverter deﬁbrillators (ICDs).
These are devices somewhat like pacemakers which monitor and regulate a person’s
cardiac rhythm, but can also deliver an electric shock should the heart’s electrical
activity and rhythm become disordered. No intervention from the person or third
parties is needed.
3 G Haddow and others, ‘Cyborgs in the Everyday: Masculinity and Biosensing Prostate Cancer’ (2015) 24
Science as Culture 484, 486.
4 D Haraway, ‘A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the late Twentieth
Century’ in Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (Routledge 1991) 149–81, 149. The
imagery of the cyborg has long been used in the sociology and science and technology studies literatures to
draw our attention to and to challenge boundaries. Famously, Haraway argues that the cyborg represents a
breach in the boundaries between human and animal, animal-human and machine, and the physical and
non-physical (151–54). However, note that Haraway’s cyborg was a speciﬁc mythologic construction aimed
at being a commentary on identity and radical feminism (amongst other things). Although we nod to her—
in particular, with regard to the transgression of boundaries—our purpose is different and much less
metaphoric.
5 G Haddow, SHE Harmon and L Gilman, ‘Implantable Smart Technologies (IST): Deﬁning the “Sting” in
Data and Device’ (2016) 24 (3) Health Care Analysis 210, 212.
6 ibid; Haddow and others (n 3). For the original discussion of cybernetic organisms, see ME Clynes and ND
Kline, ‘Cyborgs and Space’ (1960) 5 (9) Astronautics 26.
7 Haddow and others, ibid 490. See also Haddow, Harmon and Gilman (n 5).
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It will become obvious that the weight of our interest also lies in the direction of
so-called smart technologies. Notwithstanding, Thomas’ recent observation that there
is a lack of consistency on the use of this term,8 and Haddow and colleagues’ conclu-
sion that ‘smart is a complex concept that holds multiple meanings’,9 we take there to
be a large overlap between smart and integrated goods. Thus, integrated goods are
‘smart’ in the sense that they have software which executes algorithms enabling func-
tionalities such as data collection, analysis, and transmission.10 Indeed, it is exactly
because of the increasing sophistication and smartness of devices that a number of the
challenges we identify arise. Nevertheless, whilst we draw on Haddow and colleagues’
conceptualisation, we also extend it. For us, everyday cyborgs are (i) persons with
‘technologies of the carpentry kind’ such as artiﬁcial joints, as well as simple prosthetics
such as aesthetic arm prostheses and cosmetic ocular prosthetics (artiﬁcial eye); (ii)
those carrying devices, such as insulin pumps, which are automated to monitor blood
glucose and deliver insulin; (iii) persons with implanted medical devices such as pace-
makers, ICDs, cochlear implants, or deep brain neurostimulators, which regulate or
replace some physiological function or other; and (iv) persons with complex prosthetics
such as retinal prostheses (‘the bionic eye’) or myoelectric prosthetic arms.11
This wider conceptualisation has analytical beneﬁts. By looking more widely than
strictly smart or integrated, we encompass a much broader range of technologies.
This allows us to consider them on a spectrum from simpler, passive, and less techno-
logically sophisticated devices to more active, advanced, and complex ones. It is
imperative that this is done because the parts and devices at issue are vast in number
and diverse in function (of which those mentioned in this article are merely represen-
tative). The technologies of the everyday cyborg range from the simple to the com-
plex, from the well established to the cutting edge. The sheer volume and variety of
the devices make any attempt at classiﬁcation not only difﬁcult, but risks being overly
reductive. For instance, Burleson and Carrara suggest that ‘a taxonomy of [implanted
medical devices] can be deﬁned by several dimensions’.12 These include physical
location, the device’s sensing functions, computational capabilities, data storage,
8 For a brief discussion of this inconsistency, see S Thomas, ‘Security Interests in IP: Proposals for Reform’
(2017) 37 Legal Studies 214, 217–18.
9 Haddow and others (n 3) 218.
10 Cf. Hildrebrand who discusses different levels of ‘smartness’ and deﬁnes these in terms of agency (in both
the philosophical and computer science sense of that term). M Hildebrand, Smart Technologies and the
End(s) of Law (Edward Elgar 2015) 21–40. The next generation of AIMDs may also include those with arti-
ﬁcial intelligence (AI) capabilities such as utilising machine learning or natural language processing algo-
rithms (F Jiang and others, ‘Artiﬁcial Intelligence in Healthcare: Past, Present and Future’ (2017) 2 Stroke
and Vascular Neurology e000101); for instance, wearable devices which can collect and analyse data for
stroke prediction (A Mannini and others, ‘A Machine Learning Framework for Gait Classiﬁcation Using
Inertial Sensors: Application to Elderly, Post-Stroke and Huntington’s Disease Patients’ (2016) 16 Sensors
134).
11 Conceivably, the term could also be used to encompass persons who use technologies, such as mobility
assistance devices (MAD). For a case report on damage to a MAD, see L MacDonald Glenn, ‘Case study:
Ethical and Legal Issues in Human Machine Mergers (or the Cyborgs Cometh)’ (2012) 21 Annals of
Health Law 175. In this MacDonald Glenn raises the question of the blurring of bodily boundaries, which is
a thread that runs throughout this article (177–78).
12 W Burleson and S Carrara, ‘Introduction’ in W Burleson and S Carrara (eds), Security and Privacy for
Implantable Medical Devices (Springer ScienceþBusiness Media 2014) 1–11, 4–5.
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communication modes and capabilities, energy requirements, and security vulnerabil-
ities. Even a taxonomy constructed along such seemingly comprehensive lines would
neither capture all the technologies of the everyday cyborg nor the signiﬁcance of
their different aspects for the law. For example, it misses the signiﬁcance of functional-
ity construed not simply in terms of device functionality, but the functionality of and
to persons. Similarly, it does not capture the level of integration with or dependency
of persons in relation to different devices.
This article casts the technological and conceptual net wide to include a broad
spectrum of technologies. Doing this permits us to more fully explore the challenges
for the law which different technologies and different modes of integration with per-
sons might give rise to. What we will see is that, in general, challenges arise because of
(i) the transgression of the bodily boundary, (ii) the integration of the technologies
with persons, (iii) the linking of the biological with synthetic materialities, and
(iv) the nature of the technologies as integrated goods with both physical and soft-
ware components. These dimensions begin to emerge as we examine some of the key
legal dimensions of everyday cyborg technologies in the next section, and will be
more explicitly discussed in Section IV, where we will examine how they relate to
law’s boundary-work.
I I I . IDENTIFYING THE LEGAL ISSUES
A. Medical Device Regulation, Safety, and Product Liability
Recently Laurie has noted that the law often ‘creates artiﬁcial constructs that become
the object of regulatory attention of dedicated regulators who operate within legally
deﬁned spheres of inﬂuence or “silos”’.13 What we get is a ‘taxonomy of regulated
“objects” such as “data”, “tissue”, “embryos”, “devices”, “ATMPs”, and “clinical trials”,
each bounded by its own legal deﬁnition and bespoke sets of regulatory rules of pro-
duction, storage, use, and market approval.’14 And so it is with medical devices at both
UK and EU level. The relevant Regulations and Directives are constructed in such a
way that the objects (the devices themselves) rather than subjects (persons into
whom they are implanted or to whom they are attached) are the primary focus of reg-
ulatory attention.15 Speciﬁcally, the law takes a ‘bounded object’ approach,16 con-
structing medical devices as different types of objects: ‘risk objects’, ‘marketised
objects’, ‘innovation objects’, and so on.17 These constructions will be unpacked later
in this section. For example, we will see that the framing of medical devices within the
relevant regulatory instruments is intimately connected the functioning of the EU
internal market. This situates medical devices ﬁrmly in a marketised context. We argue
that the consequence of this and other regulatory framings is that, to the extent that
persons factor into the regulation and governance regarding medical devices, they do
13 G Laurie, ‘Liminality and the Limits of Law in Health Research Regulation’ (2017) 25 Medical Law Review
47, 49.
14 ibid 48–49.
15 See generally, ibid 51.
16 ibid 18.
17 Our thanks to Elen Stokes for prompting us to consider an expanded set of ways in which the law constructs
‘objects’.
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so in relation to these particular object-focused frames of reference. This, as we will
also see, is problematic.
1. Regulatory Context
Currently in the UK, medical devices are governed by the Medical Devices
Regulations 2002. These implement and give effect to three European Directives:
(i) Directive 90/385/EEC concerning active implantable medical devices (AIMDD),
(ii) Directive 93/42/EEC concerning medical devices (MDD), and (iii) Directive
98/79/EC on in vitro diagnostic medical devices (IVDD). In April 2017, after a com-
plex period of drafting, negotiation, and amendments, the EU published two new
Regulations, which repeal and replace the three previous Directives. These are
Regulation (EU) 2017/745 (Medical Device Regulations—MDR) and Regulation
(EU) 2017/746 (In Vitro Diagnostic Regulations—IVDR). Both of these came into
force in May 2017 and will be fully implemented by May 2020 and 2022, respectively.
However, their inﬂuence on the UK largely remains to be seen given uncertainties
around the exact shape of Brexit. At the time of writing, the provisions of the
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017 would mean that ‘EU-derived legislation’
that has been separately written into UK law will have the same force it had the day
before ‘exit day’.18 As such, the three medical device Directives will continue to have
force in the form they are found in the UK’s Medical Device Regulations 2002.
Whether or not any of the provisions of the new MDR and IVDR will have direct
inﬂuence on future UK law mainly depends on whether they are explicitly written
into law prior to exit day.19 This is because most of these are due to come into force
after exit day. This will either be the date of a withdrawal agreement or 2 years after
Article 50 was triggered (thus 30 March 2019).20
An overhaul of the EU’s approach, and the resultant Regulations, was deemed to
be necessary because of apparent lacunae in the Directives, including the need for bet-
ter pre- and post-market scrutiny.21 Some of the changes in particular can be seen as a
response to safety and product liability concerns arising from device failures such as
defective DePuy metal-on-metal hips and Poly Implant Prothe`se (PIP) breast
implants. The former involved the higher than normal revision rates for DePuy
Articular Surface Replacements and total metal-on-metal hips, something which has
been described as ‘one of the biggest disasters in orthopaedic history’.22 In 2012, a
Medicines and Health Regulatory Agency (MHRA) device alert encompassing all
18 s 2(1).
19 We say direct inﬂuence, because even if they do not become an explicit part of UK law, the UK will need to
revise the law in this area if they are to continue to trade with the EU with regard to medical devices. For
example, they will need to ensure compliance with EU certiﬁcation, compliance, and monitoring standards.
Indeed, current guidance on the Government website suggests the UK is proceeding as if these will be part
of UK law. See ‘Medical devices: EU regulations for MDR and IVDR’, <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/
medical-devices-eu-regulations-for-mdr-and-ivdr> accessed 2 October 2017.
20 For the implementation timetable of the new Regulations, see European Commission, ‘Regulatory
Framework’, <https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/medical-devices/regulatory-framework_en> accessed
2 October 2017.
21 ibid.
22 D Cohen, ‘Out of Joint: The Story of the ASR’ (2011) 342 British Medical Journal d2905.
6 • MEDICAL LAW REVIEW
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/medlaw/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/medlaw/fwy003/4903014
by guest
on 21 March 2018
metal-on-metal hips (not just DePuy’s) was issued,23 and in 2013 the NHS stopped
using metal-on-metal hip joints.24 In the same year, the DePuy alerts were issued, the
MHRA published a device alert in relation to silicon breast implants manufactured by
the French company PIP. French regulatory authorities discovered that the PIP had
been using a non-approved silicone gel for the implants25 and subsequent investiga-
tions revealed that these implants had a signiﬁcantly higher likelihood of rupture (by
two to six times) than other breast implants.26 The high-proﬁle nature of these medi-
cal device scandals helped to drive calls for change at EU level.27
We do not want to downplay the signiﬁcance of robust product safety and risk reg-
ulation in relation to medical devices. This is of the utmost importance, as both the
DePuy Hip and PIP breast implants scandals illustrate. Nevertheless, a very particular
approach to medical devices, which constructs them as different types of objects, is at
play in EU and, consequently, the UK legal and regulatory contexts. This is something
we have reason to be cautious about when it comes to everyday cyborgs. In what fol-
lows, we suggest that in being overly object-focused (which we will see through the
different constructions of medical devices as regulatory objects), the law is insufﬁciently
attentive to the conjoined future for which such devices as destined; that is, the implica-
tions of the assemblage of subjects and objects which everyday cyborgs represent.
2. Constructing Medical Devices as Law’s ‘Objects’
A principal way in which the relevant regulation and legislative instruments construct
medical devices is as ‘risk objects’. As deﬁned by Hilgartner, ‘risk objects’ are ‘things
that pose hazards, the sources of danger, the entities to which harmful consequences
are conceptually attached’.28 The focus on risk and safety is explicit in the medical
device Directives. Consider, for instance, Annex I of the MDD:
23 Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency, ‘Medical Device Alert: All Metal-On-Metal (MoM)
Hip Replacements’ (25 June 2012) <https://mhra.ﬁlecamcom/public/ﬁle/2n8j-aq8bkp2l> accessed 2
October 2017.
24 Tens of thousands of patients have these types of joints and in June 2017, the MHRA issued guidance on
follow-up and patient management to ensure the early detection of any problems. Medicines and
Healthcare products Regulatory Agency ‘Medical Device Alert: All metal-on-metal (MoM) hip replace-
ments: updated advice for follow-up of patients’ (29 June 2017) <https://www.gov.uk/drug-device-alerts/
all-metal-on-metal-mom-hip-replacements-updated-advice-for-follow-up-of-patients> accessed 2 October
2017. Litigation involving over 600 individual claimants is set to go ahead from October 2017 in what law
ﬁrm Leigh Day are calling ‘one of the largest product liability group actions in recent years’. Leigh Day,
‘Metal-on-metal hip trial set for October 2017’ (7 July 2016), <https://www.leighday.co.uk/News/News-
2016/July-2016/Metal-on-Metal-Hip-Trial-Set-for-October-2017> accessed 2 October 2017.
25 Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency, ‘Medical Device Alert: Silicone Gel Filled Breast
Implants Manufactured by Poly Implant Prothese (PIP) - All Models and Lot Numbers’ (31 March 2010),
<https://www.gov.uk/drug-device-alerts/medical-device-alert-all-models-and-lot-numbers-of-silicone-gel-
ﬁlled-breast-implants-unapproved-composition-of-silicone-gel> accessed 2 October 2017.
26 Department of Health, Poly Implant Prothe`se (PIP) Breast Implants: Final Report of the Expert Group
(Department of Health, June 2012) <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/ﬁle/214975/dh_134657.pdf> accessed 2 October 2017.
27 European Commission, ‘New EU Rules to Ensure Safety of Medical Devices’, <http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_MEMO-17-848_en.htm> accessed 2 October 2017.
28 S Hilgartner, The Social Construction of Risk Objects: Or How to Pry Open Networks of Risk’ in SF James
and LWW Clarke (eds), Organizations, Uncertainties, and Risk (Westview Press 1992) 39–53, 41.
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[D]evices must be designed and manufactured in such a way that, when used
under the conditions and for the purposes intended, they will not compromise
the clinical condition or the safety of patients, or the safety and health of users
or, where applicable, other persons, provided that any risks which may be associ-
ated with their intended use constitute acceptable risks when weighed against
the beneﬁts to the patient and are compatible with a high level of protection of
health and safety.29
Similar wording can be found in the AIMDD.30 The 2002 Regulations in the UK
were created under powers deriving from the Consumer Protection Act 1987 and,
given this, safety provisions within the Regulations, are made in reference to the
Act.31 In this respect, ‘safe’ is deﬁned as ‘no risk, or no risk apart from one reduced to
a minimum, that [the goods] will cause the death or, or any personal injury to, any
person whatsoever’.32
The new EU Regulations continue, and indeed strengthen, this focus on risk and
safety. This can be seen both in the Recitals and the Articles.33 Recitals 1 and 2 of the
MDR, for instance, state that ‘a fundamental revision of those Directives is needed to
establish a robust, transparent, predictable and sustainable regulatory framework for
medical devices which ensures a high level of safety and health whilst supporting inno-
vation’ and ‘this Regulation sets high standards of quality and safety for medical devi-
ces in order to meet common safety concerns as regards such products’. Almost the
exact same wording is found in the IVDR.34 The Regulations also provide for new
classiﬁcation systems for devices (which are explicitly risk-based),35 the requirement
to supply more robust clinical data and evaluations of devices,36 and increased require-
ments for post-market surveillance.37 As noted by Flear in respect of the regulation of
new health technologies in general, the EU’s regulatory techniques
. . . narrow the meaning and framing of technological risk to being principally
about product safety at different stages of product development and ultimately
marketing within the internal market. At the same time the techniques bracket
29 Annex I.I Directive 93/42/EEC.
30 Annex I.I Directive 90/385/EEC.
31 See Part II of the Consumer Protection Act 1987.
32 ibid, s 19(1)(b).
33 The MDR and IVDR are voluminous pieces of legislation. For summary of various aspects of them see the
three-part overview of the Regulations from Squire Patton Boggs: Part I, <http://www.squirepattonboggs.
com//media/ﬁles/insights/publications/2017/01/eu-medical-device-and-ivd-regulations-overview-series-
part-1/25810–eu-medical-device-alert.pdf> accessed 2 October 2017; Part II, <http://www.squirepatton
boggs.com//media/ﬁles/insights/publications/2017/02/eu-medical-device-regulation-overview-part-2/
25829life-scienceseu-medical-device-regulation-overview-part-2thought.pdf> accessed 2 October 2017; and
Part III <http://www.squirepattonboggs.com//media/ﬁles/insights/publications/2017/02/eu-in-vitro-
diagnostic-medical-device-regulation-overview-part-3/25830life-scienceseu-in-vitro-diagnostic-medical-device-
regulation-ove.pdf.> accessed 2 October 2017.
34 Recitals 1 and 2.
35 MDR, Recital 59 and Chapter V; and IVDR, Recital 55 and Chapter V.
36 MDR, Recital 63 and Chapter VI; and IVDR, Recital 61 and Chapter VI.
37 MDR, Recital 74 and Chapter VII; and IVDR, Recital 75 and Chapter VII.
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off and marginalize the other kinds of harms or hazards to which risk might
pertain.38
In this manner, the way in which risk is constructed, and the focus on risk objects is
related to the framing of medical devices as ‘marketised objects’.
This framing stems directly from the economic motivations which permeate the
EU’s (and hence the UK’s) regulatory approach, as well as its speciﬁc competences in
relation to health. In short, there is a strong connection between the development
and framing of the relevant EU law and the goal of supporting and growing the EU
internal market.39 Moreover, health is not an exclusive EU competence. Indeed, the
only speciﬁc Treaty base for health provides for supporting or coordinating action,
and for a high level of health protection to be taken into account under its other
powers; for example, the internal market or consumer protection.40 Accordingly,
health and innovation (in healthcare technologies) are not framed solely as goods in
themselves; there is also a marketised dimension to them. Thus, a number of key EU
strategy documents contain explicit economic rationales for the pursuit of both health
and innovation within the health sector. Consider, for instance, the tagline of the
Innovation Union (a Europe 2020 initiative): ‘Innovation Union is the European
Union strategy to create an innovation-friendly environment that makes it easier for
great ideas to be turned into products and services that will bring our economy
growth and jobs.’41 Note how an economic rationale runs through all four reasons for
including a health policy focus in Europe 2020:
• keeping people healthy and active for longer has a positive impact on productivity and
competitiveness;
• innovation can help make the healthcare sector more sustainable and ﬁnd new cures for
health conditions;
• the healthcare sector has an important role to play in improving skills and creating jobs
as it employs 1 in 10 of the most qualiﬁed workers in the EU;
• with a projected 45% increase in the number of people aged 65 and over in the next
20 years, ﬁnancing rising healthcare costs and access to a digniﬁed and independent life
for the ageing population will be central to the political debate.42
The three EU Directives, the 2002 UK Regulations, and the new EU Regulations
only serve to reinforce this view of the regulatory approach. These are not framed in
terms of health promotion or improving health by the use of such devices. Instead,
38 ML Flear, ‘Regulating New Technologies: EU Internal Market Law, Risk, and Socio-Technical Order’ in M
Cremona (ed), New Technologies and EU Law (OUP 2016) 74–122, 77.
39 ibid, 80–83.
40 Article 168 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union on public health. Our thanks to Daithı´ Mac
Sı´thigh and Mark Flear for drawing our attention to this point.
41 See European Commission, ‘Innovation Union’ <http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/index_
en.cfm> accessed 2 October 2017.
42 See European Commission, ‘Public Health: Europe 2020 – for a Healthier EU’ <https://ec.europa.eu/
health/europe_2020_en> accessed 2 October 2017. For an in-depth and nuanced case regarding the link
between innovation, health, and the EU internal market, see Flear (n 38).
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the focus is on the conditions for the bringing to market of medical devices and health
protection via safety and risk management procedures.43 Within such a framework,
competitiveness and market advantage rather than improving health (or other social
goals) per se become the drivers of innovation.44
And here we ﬁnd yet another dimension to the framing of medical devices. They
are often constructed as ‘innovation objects’. As noted by Stokes:
Law and regulation are associated with control and the imposition of constraints
on behaviour, whereas science and technology are imagined as endless sources
of creativity and innovation. Although these are gross caricatures, they still ani-
mate many of the policy debates on the regulation of new technology—
particularly debates that centre on the potential heavy-handedness of regulatory
activity.45
In relation to medical devices, the EU emphasises the role of innovation in the sector
and the importance of the ‘innovativeness’ of healthcare and healthcare solutions.46
Such framing is, as Stokes has noted of the Innovation Union in general, part of the
‘EU’s political identity’.47 This comes through in the new Regulations, albeit inti-
mately connected to concerns regarding both safety and the functioning of the inter-
nal market. Both the MDR and the IVDR refer to ‘a high level of safety and health
whilst supporting innovation’ and ‘the smooth functioning of the internal market as
regards medical devices’.48 It may be that the kinds of devices under consideration
here, at least in their embodied forms, are far from the minds of EU law and policy-
makers when they discuss innovation.49 This, as we are about to see, is part of the
trouble with the different framings of such devices in law and regulation.
Undoubtedly, there are other ways beyond their constructions as risk, marketised,
and innovation objects in which law and regulation frames medical devices. Our inten-
tion was to give a ﬂavour of these different constructions in order to point to a greater
risk (pun intended); that is, that there can be a neglect of important considerations
which are not object-focused. In particular, the subjects—the end users of medical
devices—can become marginalised or overlooked.50 One such example is consent
processes for the use and implantation of medical devices. Arguably, consent proc-
esses in healthcare in general are impoverished. The consent transaction as currently
43 See generally the text of the AIMDD, MDD, IVD, 2002 UK Regulations, MDR, and IVDR.
44 Flear (n 38) 115–17.
45 E Stokes, ‘Recombinant Regulation: EU Executive Power and Expertise in Responding to Synthetic
Biology’ in Regulating Risks in the European Union: The Co-production of Expert and Executive Power
(Bloomsbury Publishing 2017) 59–79, 64.
46 See, for example, the European Commission landing page on the medical device sector<https://ec.europa.
eu/growth/sectors/medical-devices_en> accessed 2 October 2017. Moreover, note how the header on this
page is ‘Growth: Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship, and SMEs’.
47 Stokes (n 45) 79.
48 This same wording is found in Recitals 1 and 2 of both the MDR and IVDR.
49 Our thanks to Aisling McMahon for this point.
50 Laurie (n 13) 51. Whilst Laurie’s discussion centres on health research regulation, his observations are
much more broadly applicable vis-a`-vis health and health technology regulation.
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practiced is binary in nature.51 A person either gives or withholds consent at the time
a procedure (e.g. implantation of a pacemaker) is due to take place (or in advance of
this, reafﬁrming it nearer the time). This, however, misses crucial aspects of what
Laurie terms ‘consent as process’;52 speciﬁcally, it neglects the ‘temporal and spatial
dimensions’ of the subject’s experience.53 In the context under discussion here, this
means persons experiences of becoming and being everyday cyborgs.
By constructing medical devices as risk objects, for instance, we ﬁx them in time
and substance. They are what they are at the time of implantation: objects discrete
from persons. They are conceptually removed from the embodied (or at least con-
joined) future for which they are destined. As such, they are disconnected from, and
in essence rule out, potential legal futures; that is, by framing and ﬁxing in a particular
way, alternative legal approaches, which are less object- and more subject-focused, are
excluded.
Relatedly, there is also a sense in which the risks associated with medical devices,
or at least the available regulatory responses to these, are also ﬁxed, or at the very least
much stagnated. We say stagnated because they are ﬁxed within the operative regula-
tory landscape until such a time as they are revised either in response to a large-scale
scandal (such as the DePuy hip failures) or until incremental changes are made
through systems of post-market surveillance, something which can be slow-moving.
Yet in reality risks relating to attached and implanted medical devices are ever-
changing; something which the increasing ‘smartness’ of certain devices may bring to
the fore. Consider, for instance, an integrated device with wiﬁ. Such a device may be
able not just to process and send data to servers, but to receive updates—software
and informational. This two-way trafﬁc represents a device in a state of ﬂux (not to
mention there may also be feedback loops internal to the devices functioning).
Plausibly the risks associated with such devices are also subject to constant change,
potentially in response to the day-to-day activities or physiological state of the every-
day cyborg.54 Whilst new post-market surveillance procedures mandated by the MDR
and IVDR might help to address regulatory stagnation to a certain degree, it, never-
theless, does not provide an altogether satisfactory framework (either conceptually or
practically) for thinking about medical devices or everyday cyborgs.
Conceptually speaking, the object focus is problematic, because, as Hilgartner
argues:
[T]he world does not present itself prepackaged into unambiguous and clearly-
differentiated objects. On the contrary, the division of the world into objects is a
conceptual achievement. The world can be parsed in many different ways, and
category systems used to classify objects are fundamentally ambiguous.55
51 M Quigley, Self-ownership, Property Rights, and the Human Body: A Legal and Philosophical Analysis (CUP
2018) 272.
52 Laurie (n 13) 61 [emphasis in original].
53 ibid 62.
54 We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for their thoughts on risk and feedback loops.
55 Hilgartner (n 28) 42.
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Moreover, as Section II demonstrated, and we will see further in Section IV, the trans-
gression of the bodily boundary and the re-formation of persons as integrated persons
means that neither the object nor the subject ought to be construed as ﬁxed. As
Hoeyer observes, ‘technologies using and engaging with “the human body” challenge
ideas about body boundaries . . . [these] are not given and never have been – they are
under constant establishment, biologically as well as culturally.’56 Becoming and being
an everyday cyborg involves the deconstruction and (re)establishment of boundaries:
it involves process and transformation, something not captured by the current regula-
tory approach.57 These processual aspects are important if we think that the
(approach of the) law ought to be reﬂective of the reality of people’s lives. Laurie has
highlighted the importance of this in his discussion of health research regulation. He
says:
The attention of law and regulation on ‘bounded objects’ such as personal data
and tissue should be questioned on at least two counts: ﬁrst, for the fallacy of
attempting to ‘ﬁx’ such regulatory objects, and to divorce them from their source
and the potential impact on identity for the subjects themselves; and, second,
for the failure to see such objects as also experiencing liminality [being in
between states and as undergoing transformation]. Both of these points suggest
a need to approach the management of regulation in processual and potentially
transformative terms.58
Practically speaking, in constructing and ﬁxing medical devices as different types of
‘objects’, current law and regulation may simply not be ﬂexible or responsive enough
to deal with changing and unforeseen risks arising from the joining of persons with
integrated devices.
B. Damage to Devices and Liability
The difﬁculties for the law regarding everyday cyborgs are also evident when we think
about the issue of damage to devices. How ought the law to deal with damage to a
highly integrated medical device or prosthesis? Ought it to view this as personal
injury, damage to property, or something else? Medical devices and prostheses begin
life unambiguously as external things. As such, they are uncontroversially viewed as
items of personal property (chattels).59 They are transferred, bought, and sold, and
those who possess them are protected by the usual operation of personal property
law. The underlying conceptual question to be answered, therefore, is whether these
devices retain their property status upon implantation or attachment, somehow lose it
by becoming part of the living body, or acquire some sort of hybrid status. The
answers to such questions are not straightforward.
56 K Hoeyer, Exchanging Human Bodily Material: Rethinking Bodies and Markets (Springer 2013), vi.
57 See Laurie (n 13) for process and transformation in health research regulation.
58 ibid 68.
59 Quigley (n 51) 253.
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An old Health Notice issued in 1983 by the then Department of Health and Social
Security (DHSS) states that
On implantation, an implant becomes the property of the person in whom it
has been implanted and it remains his or her property even if it is subsequently
removed. Following the patient’s death, it forms part of his or her estate unless
there is any speciﬁc provision to the contrary.60
This is a position that has more recently been re-stated by the MHRA61 and can also
be found in advice from various medical negligence ﬁrms.62 Despite its acceptance by
these organisations, the policy is of questionable legal provenance and usefulness. Not
only does it have no ﬁrm basis in any established law regarding either persons (living
or deceased) or medical devices (or things more generally), it almost certainly runs
counter to it.
As noted by Dickenson, the law considers that something is either a person (sub-
ject) or a thing (object), ‘but not both’.63 Although it is unusual to ﬁnd explicit state-
ments within the law to this effect, it can be clearly seen in its internal structure.
Broadly speaking, the law is divided into that which relates to persons (e.g. assault
and battery, personal injury, medical negligence, etc.) and that which relates to things
in the external world (e.g. land law, personal property, sale of goods, etc.).64 There is
thus an implicit, yet foundational, incorporation into the law of a subject–object
dichotomy. The speciﬁc question of the property status of medical devices once
implanted into or integrated with the body has not been tested in the courts.
Nevertheless, in R v Bentham we do ﬁnd a statement, albeit in a different context,
which is reﬂective of this general position. This question at issue, as put by Lord
Bingham, was whether
a person who has his hand inside a zipped-up jacket, forcing the material out so
as to give the impression that he has a gun, [could] be held to have in his posses-
sion an imitation ﬁrearm within the meaning of section 17(2) of the Firearms
Act 1968.65
60 Department of Health and Social Security, ‘Health Services Management Ownership of Implants and
Removal of Cardiac Pacemakers After Death’ Health Notice HN(83)6 (London 1983) <http://webarch
ive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20141206201515/http://www.mhra.gov.uk/home/groups/dts-bi/documents/
websiteresources/con123256.pdf> accessed 2 Oct 2017.
61 See MHRA, ‘Leaving Hospital With a Medical Device’ <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/
20130513170749/http://www.mhra.gov.uk/Safetyinformation/Generalsafetyinformationandadvice/
Adviceandinformationforconsumers/Leavinghospitalwithamedicaldevice/index.htm> accessed 2 October
2017.
62 See, for example, advice from Bevan Brittan and Clark Wilmott, both of which reference the notice
<https://www.bevanbrittan.com/insights/articles/2012/metalonmetalhipreplacements> accessed 2
October 2017 and <https://www.clarkewillmott.com/blog/ownership-of-medical-implants/> accessed 2
October 2017.
63 D Dickenson, Property in the Body: Feminist Perspectives (2nd edn, CUP 2017) 5. See also Quigley (n 51),
ch 8, s 3.
64 Although we note that fundamentally all law regulates dealings between persons (or legal persons such as
corporations), even law which is about objects.
65 R v Bentham [2005] UKHL 18 [1].
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The answer for the House of Lords in this case was no, in particular, that a person’s
ﬁngers could not be considered to be property.66 Part of the reasoning was as follows:
One cannot possess something which is not separate and distinct from oneself.
An unsevered hand or ﬁnger is part of oneself. Therefore, one cannot possess it
. . . What is possessed must under deﬁnition be a thing. A person’s hand or ﬁn-
gers are not a thing.67
Hence, the law regarding property entails a normative prerequisite of separation from
persons,68 that is, a division between subject and object. Pragmatically, this may not
be completely insurmountable for the law, although we will suggest shortly that it is
conceptually problematic.
In the context of prostheses, Goold and colleagues argue that both personal injury
law and property law could be applicable depending on the device and circumstances
at hand. Conceivably, the most straightforward situation relates to an unattached pros-
thesis. In terms of the criminal law, the Theft Act 1968 would apply if stolen and the
Criminal Damage Act 1971 and the Criminal Justice Act 1983 if damaged.69
Meanwhile, civil liability for damage would lie with the torts which protect property
(conversion, trespass to goods, and negligence).70 Where attached to and integrated
with the living body, Goold and colleagues argue that damage done could be consid-
ered as an offence against the person. They point out that common assault does not
require actual bodily injury, and so damage or an attempt to damage an attached pros-
thesis could be classiﬁed thus.71 On the civil side, trespass to the person and negli-
gence could both be available routes for redress.72
The main difﬁculty is establishing whether appropriate redress (including penalties
and compensation) is available via the different legal routes.73 There is a marked dif-
ference in the law’s approach to damage to property and harm to persons. The crimi-
nal law treats harm to persons much more seriously than damage to property. Whilst
the penalties available for criminal damage to property and offences against the per-
sons (such as assault) both depend on the degree of damage/harm (as well as aggra-
vating factors), the scope and scale of penalties (as we move from minor to more
serious crimes) are generally greater in the case of offences against the person. At the
very lowest end, the penalties are arguably comparable. Compare, for example, crimi-
nal damage to property not occasioning actual damage (or where the damage is not
lasting/serious) with common assault and where no actual bodily harm is inﬂicted (or
66 ibid [8].
67 ibid.
68 M Quigley, ‘Property in Human Biomaterials: Separating Persons and Things?’ (2012) 32 Oxford Journal
of Legal Studies 659.
69 I Goold, H Maslen and C Auckland, ‘Damage to Prostheses and Compensation for Harm’, (2017) Working
Paper, 19.
70 ibid.
71 ibid 14.
72 ibid 15.
73 What follows is a necessarily brief indication of the issues involved for both the criminal and civil. For an in-
depth discussion of these, including a fulsome one of remedies and penalties, see Goold, Maslen, and
Auckland’s informative article, ibid.
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where there is no lasting/serious harm). For the lowest level of criminal damage, the
maximum penalty is a Band C ﬁne (125–175% of an offender’s weekly income).74 In
the case of the lowest level of common assault, the maximum penalty is the same.75
As the seriousness of the offences increase, however, the difference between damage
to property and harm to persons becomes apparent. Consider moderate and signiﬁ-
cant criminal damage to property. If moderate damage to property, the maximum
penalty is a medium-level community order. If signiﬁcant damage, it is 12 weeks cus-
tody.76 Compare this to the two lowest categories of assault occasioning actual bodily
harm. The maximum penalty for the least serious offences is a high-level community
order. The next level (entailing greater harm and lower culpability or lesser harm and
greater culpability) can attract a custodial sentence of up to 51 weeks.77
Likewise, with regard to tort law, although there is a sliding scale regarding recom-
pense, depending on the exact details of individual cases, in general, harm to persons
attracts higher levels of compensation than damage to property. Damages for torts
relating to property and those relating to persons aim to put the claimant in the posi-
tion they would have been had the wrong not been committed.78 Negligent damage
to goods is compensated either by the cost of repair79 or that of the replacement of
the goods.80 A variety of consequential losses may also be compensated. In the case,
for example, of a damaged car, the claimant may be compensated for the repair or
replacement of the car, as well as losses such as those incurred in hiring a car81 or loss
of proﬁts consequent on not being able to use the car.82 With regard to personal
injury both pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses may be compensated. The range and
scope of the damages which may be awarded are, however, much broader. And, conse-
quently, the overall level of damages awarded potentially much higher. Damages for
pecuniary losses can include loss of earnings,83 medical expenses,84 buying special
equipment or moving to special accommodation amongst other things.85 Damages
may also compensate for non-pecuniary losses, usually (i) loss of amenity and
74 Sentencing Guidelines Council, Magistrates’ Court Sentencing Guidelines: Deﬁnitive Guideline (Crown
Copyright 2008) 44.
75 Sentencing Council, Assault: Deﬁnitive Guideline (Crown Copyright 2011) 24.
76 Sentencing Guidelines Council (n 74).
77 Sentencing Council (n 75) 12.
78 For a general discussion of damages in these areas, see A Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract
(3rd edn, OUP 2004), chs9 and 10, and H McGregor, McGregor on Damages (Sweet and Maxwell 2014),
especially chs 4, 35, 36, and 38. For speciﬁc discussion in the case of prostheses, see Goold, Maslen and
Auckland (n 69).
79 See, eg The London Corporation [1935] P 70 at 77 and Coles v Hetherton [2013] EWCA Civ 1704 [28],
[2014] 3 All ER 377 [28] p.
80 See, eg, The Columbus (1849) 3 Wm Rob 158 at 162 and The Maersk Colombo [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 275.
81 O’ Grady v Westminster Scaffolding Ltd [1962] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 238.
82 See, eg The Hebridean Coast [1960] 2 All ER 85 at 94, [1960] 3 WLR 29 at 40–41 and The Naxos [1972] 1
Lloyd’s Rep 149.
83 British Transport Commission v Gourley [1956] AC 185; Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas
25 39.
84 As stated by McGregor, ‘no authority is needed to support this statement, for cases are legion which include
such outlays in the damages awarded’. McGregor (n 78) 38–181.
85 George v Pinnock [1973] 1 WLR 118 at 124H-124C.
Integrated Persons and Integrated Goods • 15
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/medlaw/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/medlaw/fwy003/4903014
by guest
on 21 March 2018
(ii) pain and suffering. These are awarded on a tariff basis, for instance, from £1,950
for certain orthopaedic injuries to £322,060 for very severe brain injuries.86
The relevance of all this for the everyday cyborg is that viewing a prosthesis
(or indeed other medical devices, implanted or otherwise), as objects of property may
not offer adequate redress for damage done. The reason being that remedies available
for either criminal or negligent damage to property may not capture the vital func-
tions (mechanical, physiological, or otherwise) that these devices serve for persons.
Moreover, they do not take account of the incorporation into (the lives of) persons
which they represent (more on this in Section IV). In the case of a one of a kind
sophisticated neuro-prosthesis, for instance, even the replacement value of the device
plus some consequential losses may not appropriately capture the loss to the person
of the original and thus the wrong(s) done.
The challenge is captured well by Laurie’s description of the ‘impositional nature
of law’.87 Law, ‘by its nature, seeks to establish structures, ﬁx regulatory objects, assign
responsibilities, and attribute liabilities’.88 This impositional nature is highlighted by
the discussion in this section. When asking how the law would deal with challenges
related to damage, it becomes clear that we are required to ‘ﬁx’ the thing in question
as either a subject or an object in order to assess which part of the law is most apt to
deal with it. In one sense, this is simply pragmatic. The law needs to ﬁnd a resolution
to a variety of conﬂicts and to work within its existing structure to do so. This will be
illustrated further in Section III(D) when we discuss biohacking. There we will see
that, although a wide array of either subject or object-based liabilities may be available
for harm ensuing from hacking, they would likely still follow the usual well-delineated
subject or object-focused pathways. Although pragmatic within the current constraints
of the law, it is not quite satisfactory when advancing technology challenges the very
ontological nature of such divisions, as is the case with integrated persons. In essence,
challenges such as these fall outwith the operative boundaries of the law’s current con-
ceptual framework. This is not to say that the law cannot deal with such issues if and
when they arise. The ability to do so and to adapt accordingly over time is one of the
strengths of a common law system, and as Goold and colleagues’ argue, the law as it
stands could be made to work in this area. Nevertheless, as we will demonstrate in
Section IV, a re-analysis of the law, along with the conceptual and philosophical
terrain underpinning it, may still be needed.
C. Data and Privacy
Integral to the everyday cyborg are integrated goods. As explained by Thomas, these
are ‘goods which have a high level of integration between the physical functionality of
the goods, and the software enabling the functionality’.89 For example, many medical
devices such as pacemakers and implantable cardioverter deﬁbrillators now have inte-
grated software which enables the device to diagnose when a condition requires
86 This is done in accordance with guidelines set out by the Judicial College. Judicial College, Guidelines for the
Assessment of General Damages in Personal Injury Cases (14th edn, OUP 2017).
87 Laurie (n 13) 71.
88 ibid.
89 S Thomas, ‘Sale of Goods and Intellectual Property: Problems with Ownership’ (2014) 96 Intellectual
Property Forum 25, 25.
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therapy. Further, they can control the delivery of therapy to the patient’s body. This
integration of hardware (tangible) and software (intangible) is crucial. Albeit in a dif-
ferent context, as noted by Scott Baker J in St Albans City & District Council v
International Computers Ltd, ‘[b]y itself hardware can do nothing. The really impor-
tant part of the system is the software. Programs are the instructions or commands
that tell the hardware what to do’.90 Amongst other things, the functionality added by
software and wiﬁ capabilities enables devices to collect, store, and transmit data about
patients’ health, as well as data about the status and function of devices themselves.
This data collection can be done in a number of different ways. For instance, a
patient’s healthcare team can extract information during an outpatient hospital visit.
Alternatively, where the device is equipped with remote monitoring technology, the
data can be transmitted automatically via a wireless connection to a secure website;
subsequently, this data can then be accessed by the healthcare team (patients can also
manually start data transfer if they are experiencing ‘symptomatic episodes’).91 This
allows the patient’s condition and device to be monitored remotely by healthcare pro-
fessionals. The data collected by the device could include identifying information
about the patient such as their name and date of birth, information about the their
health status such as vital signs, diagnosed conditions, and therapies, and data relating
to the device’s function, for example, battery status, lead impedance, disabling of ther-
apy, and inadequate safety margins for sensing or capture.92
Where prostheses and implants collect, store, and transmit data, questions relating
to the control of data and privacy come to the fore. Although data and privacy con-
cerns regarding other types of healthcare data, such as electronic records, have
received a reasonable amount of attention,93 the everyday cyborg context has not. To
help to think about what the difﬁculties here might be, consider the story of Hugo
Campo from the USA. Hugo suffers from heart disease and has an ICD.94 This col-
lects data about its own function and Hugo’s health status, and the data is transmitted
to the manufacturer of the device. Medtronic, the manufacturer, then processes the
90 [1996] EWCA Civ 1296.
91 See, for example, National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, ‘CareLink Network Service for Remote
Monitoring of People with Cardiac Devices’ Medtech Innovation Brieﬁng (24 May 2016) 1–5, <https://
www.nice.org.uk/advice/mib64> accessed 2 Oct 2017.
92 K Fu, ‘Inside Risks - Reducing Risks of Implantable Medical Devices: A Prescription to Improve Security
and Privacy of Pervasive Health Care’ (2009) 52(6) Communications of the ACM 25, 26; Camara, Peris-
Lopez and Tapiador (n 2); H Burri and D Senouf, ‘Remote Monitoring and Follow-Up of Pacemakers and
Implantable Cardioverter Deﬁbrillators’ (2009) 11 Europace 701, 701.
93 For a small sample, see L Stevens, C Dobbs, KH Jones and G Laurie, ‘Dangers from Within?: Looking
Inwards at the Role of Maladministration as the Leading Cause of Health Data Breaches in the UK’ in R
Leenes and others (eds), Data Protection and Privacy: (In)visibilities and Infrastructures. Law, Governance and
Technology Series (Springer 2017) 1–29; G Laurie and others, A Review of Evidence Relating to Harm
Resulting from Uses of Health and Biomedical Data (Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics 2015); MJ Taylor, ‘Health
Research, Data Protection, and the Public Interest in Notiﬁcation’ (2011) 19 Medical Law Review 267; B
Prainsack, ‘Genetic Data and the Law: A Critical Perspective on Privacy Protection’ (2014) 22 Medical Law
Review 291; and 11.JM Victor, ‘The EU General Data Protection Regulation: Toward a Property Regime
for Protecting Data Privacy’ (2013) 123 Yale Law Journal 513.
94 L Blake, ‘Health Care in the Digital Age: Who Owns the Data?’ Wall Street Journal (28 November 2012)
<http://live.wsj.com/video/health-care-in-the-digital-agewho-owns-the-data/28B6E0AD-8506-40B2-
A659-20A9B696F524.html#!28B6E0AD-8506-40B2-A659-20A9B696F524> accessed 2 October 2017.
Integrated Persons and Integrated Goods • 17
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/medlaw/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/medlaw/fwy003/4903014
by guest
on 21 March 2018
data and sends the results to the Hugo’s doctor through a web portal. The informa-
tion is not sent to the patient himself. Whilst patients who want access to the data
from their ICDs can pay for biannual consultations with their doctors to obtain short
summaries of the data, Hugo and a number of other heart patients want direct and
immediate access to their data. Requests to this effect have, however, been denied by
Medtronic.
Medtronic say that under the Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) regulations,
they are permitted to send reports to doctors through their web portal, but not to
patients.95 They maintain that they will require the FDA approval to send the data to
patients and, even with such approval, there are other regulations that might restrict
them from delivering the data.96 They also raise the issue of costs, claiming that they
will need to create a website speciﬁcally for patients, which will be costly, particularly
because according to them, there are not an overwhelming number of patients who
want direct access to their ICD data. Additionally, there also appears to be a concern
that patients might misunderstand and misinterpret the data.97 Perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, some patients disagree, contending that the data from ICDs should belong to
them because it is their bodies, hearts, and data. They also say that regular feedback
will enable them to become better informed about their health, helping them to man-
age their health more effectively.98
Whilst this particular story is from the USA, it highlights tensions regarding the
ownership and control of data generated and collected by medical devices. In the UK,
the question of who ought to have control over data collected from prostheses and
implants does not necessarily have an easy answer. This is because the sheer range of
data collected by such devices means that the existing legal framework may not give
adequate cover or protection to the everyday cyborg in respect of data usage. For
brevity (and because the law relating to data protection is now voluminous and com-
plex), we restrict our comments to three issues: (i) data access; (ii) exemptions and
derogations in relation to research usages; and (iii) the signiﬁcance of different data
types.
The Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA), for now, is the main source of data protec-
tion law in the UK. This implements the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive
(Directive 95/46/EC). However, a new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
(Regulation (EU) 2016/679), which will replace the Directive, was adopted in April
2016 and comes into force from May 2018.99 Like the MDR and the IVDR, those
parts of the GDPR in force before exit day would automatically become part of UK
law in virtue of the provisions of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill.
Nevertheless, the UK has already drafted a Data Protection Bill (DPB) that aims to
implement the GDPR. This began its passage through Parliament in September 2017
and deals with the GDPR, as well as supplementary issues not covered by it. This is
95 ibid.
96 ibid.
97 ibid.
98 ibid.
99 For an overview of the GDPR see Information Commissioner’s Ofﬁce, ‘Overview of the General Data
Protection Regulation’ (17 August 2017), available at <https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/data-
protection-reform/overview-of-the-gdpr-1-12.pdf> accessed 2 October 2017.
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necessary, because, regardless of Brexit, compliance with the standards set out in the
GDPR will be required if data ﬂow is to be permitted between the EU and the UK.
For the purposes of the DPA 1998, ‘personal data’ are data from living persons
who can be identiﬁed either from that data or from a combination of that data and
other information already held.100 Data about a person’s physical or mental health are
deemed to be ‘sensitive personal data’.101 Similarly, under the DPB, personal informa-
tion ‘means any information relating to an identiﬁed or identiﬁable living individ-
ual’.102 The GDPR includes ‘online identiﬁers’ such as IP addresses and cookies as
part of personal data, in effect expanding what counts as such.103 Whereas the 1998
Act has a special category of ‘sensitive data’, which includes health data, the GDPR
and DPB refer to ‘sensitive processing’, thus shifting the emphasis from the data to
what happens to it.104 The processing of biometric, health, and genetic data is
included in this.105
Under the GDPR and the DPB, like the 1998 Act, individuals have a putative
degree of control over the use of their data. The GDPR is clear that consent is needed
for the processing of personal data.106 This must be explicit with regard to special cat-
egories of data, including health data.107 The 1998 Act gave individuals a right to
access regarding any personal data held about them, this carries on in the GDPR and
DPB.108 Additionally, the GDPR creates a new right of portability, meaning that per-
sons have the right to have their data transferred from one data controller to another
‘in a structured, commonly used, machine-readable and interoperable format’.109
Although formulated to enable transfer between different IT environments (e.g.
cloud-based storage systems), there is no reason in principle why this right would not
apply to device-mediated everyday cyborg data. Hence, in the UK, everyday cyborgs
such as Hugo could apply to see any health-related data held about them which has
been downloaded from their devices (be this by a hospital or manufacturer or some
other organisation).
Despite these provisions, arguably the 1998 Act and the GDPR take a research
friendly approach and, in so doing, allow exemptions and derogations that potentially
weaken the putative control of individuals regarding their data. Both permit health
data to be processed, subject to certain safeguards,110 without the need for explicit
consent if the processing is necessary for medical purposes, including for research
100 s 1(1)(e).
101 s 2. While the type of data discussed in this article would by its nature be quintessentially personal data,
there have been cases where it has not been so clear whether data would constitute personal data. For an
example of these cases, see Department of Health v Information Commissioner [2011] EWHC 1430 (Admin)
(Cranston J); R (on the application of W, X, Y and ) v Secretary of State for Health v The Secretary of State for
the Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ 1034, (Lord Dyson MR).
102 s 2(2).
103 Recital 30.
104 GDPR, art 9 and DPB, s 33(4)-(5).
105 s 33(8). Deﬁnitions of these types of data is provided in s 184.
106 GDPR, Recitals 32 and 40, and arts 6 and 7.
107 GDPR 9(2)(a). Although see 9(2)(h) and (i) for potential health-related exemptions.
108 DPA 1998, s 7, and schs 2 and 3; GDPR. Recital 63; and DPB, s 43.
109 GDPR, Recital 68 and art 20.
110 See, for example, GDPR, art 89.
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purposes.111 Article 89 of the GDPR permits potentially broad derogations in this
respect. As such, the EU or Member States could derogate in respect of rights of
access, rectiﬁcation, restrictions on processing, and objections to processing (as long
as measures to respect the principle of data minimisation—such as pseudonymisa-
tion—have been put in place; that is, that processing is ‘adequate, relevant and limited
to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed’).112
Consequently, although the GDPR may well meet one of its principal aims, which is
to give individuals greater control over their personal data, it remains to be seen
whether it goes far enough.113
One aspect of particular interest is the question of the types of data generated and
collected speciﬁcally by medical devices. It is debatable, for instance, whether data col-
lected about device status and function can be classiﬁed as personal, or its processing
deemed as sensitive. At ﬁrst glance, it might seem like data about device functioning
would not be covered by the 1998 Act, the GDPR, or the DPB and would fall outside
the scope of the everyday cyborg’s limited control. Although it comes from devices
implanted into or attached to persons, it is not information that relates to the living
individual (the subject), but rather it relates directly to an object (the medical device
or prosthesis). However, the conjoined subject–object context which everyday
cyborgs represent challenges the subject–object divide represented by the division of
data types (personal versus device data). There are at least two reasons for this.
First, information regarding device functioning is undoubtedly of use to manufac-
turers (as an aid to identifying problems with devices) and unknown future patients
might beneﬁt from the development of improved devices. However, it is also plausible
not only that current patients have an interest in what such data can tell them, but
that it might be directly useful to them. Patients might have an interest in better
understanding how their bodies and health condition interact with or affect device
functioning; for instance, whether devices perform better or worse (or just the same)
in situations where they are under increased physiological stress.114 If this is correct,
then it at least raises the possibility that device data ought to be treated as ‘personal’.
Secondly, there is an ontological and conceptual dimension to maintaining a dis-
tinction between data types in the conjoined context. In viewing implanted medical
devices and integrated prostheses solely as objects somehow separate from persons
(despite physical and functional integration), we set them apart from those persons.
Yet the assemblage of integrated persons and integrated devices signiﬁes an ontologi-
cal blurring of boundaries between subject and object, which the conceptual founda-
tions and structure of the law have not hitherto had to account for. For everyday
111 DPA, schs 3 and 8 and GDPR, Recitals 50-54 and art 9.
112 GDPR, art 5(1)(c).
113 One particular issue of interest is the requirement, under certain circumstances, for data protection by
‘design and by default’—in other words ‘privacy by design’—to be built into a range of technical, systems,
and organisational measures (GDPR, Recital 78 and art 25). These include designing in security measures
and data minimisation. For a brief discussion of this, see Information Commissioner’s Ofﬁce, Big Data,
Artiﬁcial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and Data Protection (2017) 72–74, <https://ico.org.uk/media/for-
organisations/documents/2013559/big-data-ai-ml-and-data-protection.pdf> accessed 2 October 2017.
114 Our thanks to one of the anonymous reviewers for this.
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cyborgs, it is simply not obvious that data about how medical devices function ought
to be treated all that differently from physiological data about how the body is func-
tioning. Part of the intuition that there is a difference here may have as much to do
with perceived distinctions between the biological and the synthetic as it does with
those between subject and object. We will return to this aspect in Section IV.
D. Security and Biohacking
In recent years there has been a growing movement of people who have been ‘hack-
ing’ their bodies (so-called biohacking); that is, altering or augmenting their bodies
through a number of DIY methods, including by the use of implanted and wearable
devices. Usually this is done without the involvement of a medical professional, and
outside the healthcare setting. The aims of those using technology in this way are
diverse. Some do it to improve their health, others to enhance their senses or extend
their human abilities. Included in this are those who have modiﬁed their medical
equipment to add new functions.
One example of a biohacker is Neil Harbisson, an artist and cyborg activist, who
has an antenna implanted in his skull that allows him to hear colour. Neil was born
with achromatopsia, and as a result of this condition, he can only see in shades of
grey. The antenna’s internet connection enables Neil to receive colours directly into
his head through external devices such as mobile phones or satellites.115 Another
example is the #WeAreNotWaiting movement. Here people with diabetes are explor-
ing various methods of using technology to improve the management of their condi-
tion. Some of these have developed their own homemade ‘artiﬁcial pancreas’.116 For
instance, Dana Lewis and her husband developed an artiﬁcial pancreas to help manage
her Type 1 Diabetes. They did so because Dana was unhappy with the limitations of
medical devices on offer. She did not think they functioned adequately in measuring
and controlling her blood sugar levels.117 The couple hacked into Dana’s glucose
monitor, modiﬁed it, and connected it to her insulin pump. They created a closed
loop system that can predict what her blood sugar level will be some hours into the
future and then automatically deliver the correct dose of insulin. They have made the
source code available online, and device manufacturers are currently developing new
devices using their prototypes.118
A potentially more troubling instance of biohacking would involve the malicious
hacking of a person’s medical device by third parties. As implanted medical devices
have become more sophisticated, concerns have grown regarding potential security
vulnerabilities that would allow them to be hacked. In 2012, a US Government of
115 BBC Radio 4, ‘Meet the Cyborgs: Five People Who Have Modiﬁed Their Bodies with Tech’, <http://
www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/articles/1g2gNvk4Gc4MwYqhtQ8KNlf/meet-the-cyborgs-ﬁve-people-who-
have-modiﬁed-their-bodies-with-tech> accessed 2 October 2017.
116 ‘The #WeAreNotWaiting Movement is Helping People with Diabetes Improve Their Health Now, Not
Later’, <https://www.diabetes.co.uk/blog/2016/07/the-wearenotwaiting-movement-is-helping-people-
with-diabetes-improve-their-health-now-not-later/> accessed 2 October 2017.
117 BBC Radio 4 (n 115).
118 ibid. Some of the platforms that have been launched as part of the movement include OpenAps.org (which
was founded by Dana), Nightscout, x-Drip, and the Tidepool; See ‘The #WeAreNotWaiting Movement’
(n116).
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Accountability Ofﬁce report identiﬁed the potential for security threats from a number
of medical device vulnerabilities, including unauthorised access, malware, and denial-
of-service attacks.119 Moreover, security specialists and hackers have demonstrated
that the remote hacking of devices such as pacemakers is not only possible, but rela-
tively easy.120 Concerns about hacking, especially the possibility of being assassinated
via a malicious attack, prompted former US Vice-President Dick Cheney to have the
wireless capabilities of his pacemaker disabled.121
Both types of biohacking draw attention to potential difﬁculties for the law. The
ﬁrst, which we will outline in the next section, is whether the actions of DIY biohack-
ers who alter medical devices infringe intellectual property rights held in respect of
such devices and their software. The second relates to liability for harms that might
ﬂow from either the direct modiﬁcation of devices or from making available the
source code to allow others to modify devices. The third centres on malicious interfer-
ence with either devices or wireless communications to devices.
Where modiﬁcations to devices and prostheses are done by those who are not
healthcare professionals (or the manufacturers), they are in essence operating outwith
the limits and protections of both medical device regulation and healthcare law. As
such, biohackers and the products they develop circumvent or contravene law and
regulation that has been developed with product safety in mind.122 A principal con-
cern in such scenarios is that of liability for harms which ﬂow from modiﬁed devices.
Consider this in terms of the functionality of relevant devices. Many technologies of
the everyday cyborg contain software that enables the devices to monitor and diag-
nose particular conditions. They can also control the subsequent delivery of a therapy,
for example, an electric shock from an ICD or insulin from an insulin pump. In such
instances, a malfunction could pose signiﬁcant risk to the patient, perhaps causing a
failure to detect when therapy is required or delivering inappropriate therapy (or
indeed none at all). Such malfunctions could result in serious injury or even death in
certain circumstances.123 Think, for instance, of an ICD that fails to detect an irregular
119 US Government of Accountability Ofﬁce, ‘Medical Devices: FDA Should Expand Its Consideration of
Information Security for Certain Types of Devices’ (US Government of Accountability Ofﬁce, 31 August
2012) (GAO-12-816)15,<http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-816> accessed 2 October 2017.
120 See K McGowan, ‘I Want to Know What Code is Running Inside My Body’ Wired (2 November 2016)
<https://www.wired.com/2016/02/i-want-to-know-what-code-is-running-inside-my-body/> accessed 2
October 2017; L Tung, ‘Marie’s Mission to Highlight Flaws in Medical Devices’, Sunday Morning Herald
(27 November 2015), <http://www.smh.com.au/it-pro/security-it/maries-mission-to-highlight-fatal-ﬂaws-
in-medical-devices-20151126-gl9dwp.html> accessed 2 October 2017; D Pauli, ‘Thousands of “Directly
Hackable” Hospital Devices Exposed’, The Register (29 September 2015) <https://www.theregister.co.uk/
2015/09/29/thousands_of_directly_hackable_hospital_devices_found_exposed/> accessed 2 October
2017; and BBC, ‘Cyber-ﬂaw Affects 745,000 Pacemakers’ (30 August 2017) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/technology-41099867> accessed 2 October 2017.
121 A Peterson, ‘Yes, Terrorists Could Have Hacked Dick Cheney’s Heart’,Washington Post (21 October 2013)
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2013/10/21/yes-terrorists-could-have-hacked-
dick-cheneys-heart/> accessed 2 October 2017.
122 W Barﬁeld and A Williams, ‘Law, Cyborgs, and Technologically Enhanced Brains’ (2017) 2 Philosophies 1, 4.
123 Camara, Peris-Lopez and Tapiador (n 2) 273; K Fu, ‘Inside Risks - Reducing Risks of Implantable Medical
Devices: A Prescription to Improve Security and Privacy of Pervasive Health Care’ (2009) 52
Communications of the ACM 25, 26.
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heart rhythm, or worse, fails to deliver a life-saving shock to a patient’s heart when it
goes into a life-threatening rhythm. Consider also a myoelectric prosthetic arm that
malfunctions when the user is driving, thereby causing an accident and endangering
other road users as well as themselves.124
Ordinarily medical devices and other relevant product liability law would be appli-
cable in those instances where there is a design or manufacturing defect in a device.125
However, it is not clear what the situation is where a biohacker (either the everyday
cyborg themselves or a third party) alters a product after it has left the manufac-
turer.126 If a person suffers harm from using the modiﬁed product, who ought to be
liable? Would a ﬁnding of liability against a DIY biohacker be mitigated by the exis-
tence of the security vulnerability that enabled them to alter the device? Would this
make the manufacturer partially liable? Furthermore, where the source code has been
released (as in the case of the hacked glucose monitor) and other people use this
code, who would be liable for any resultant harms?
In the case of malicious interference and third-party hacking, at least initial
recourse might be found in the Computer Misuse Act 1990. The Act contains a num-
ber of offences which could be applicable in the case of medical devices, including
that of unauthorised access to computer material, acts which impair the operation of a
computer, and acts causing (or risking) serious damage.127 Quite deliberately the Act,
and subsequent amendments to it, do not specify what a computer is, and it seems
likely that the types of medical devices discussed here would fall within the Act’s
ambit. Nevertheless, the use of this Act might not adequately account for the conse-
quences of hacking in the everyday cyborg situation. Because the Act is object-focused
(i.e. computers), its sanctions, in the form of prison terms and ﬁnes, are in line with
this128 and not as serious as when harm to persons occurs.
In the everyday cyborg context, hacking devices is to a certain extent hacking per-
sons, and the consequences of this could be serious. Think, for instance, of an ICD
that fails to detect an irregular heart rhythm, or worse, fails to deliver a life-saving
shock to a patient’s heart when it goes into a life-threatening rhythm. As such, we
need to ask what other routes would be available for harms done by hackers. In princi-
ple at least, the whole array of both object-focused liabilities—such as those stemming
from the Computer Misuse Act—and subject-focused ones129—such as assault or
even involuntary manslaughter or murder130—ought to be available for harm done.
Murder, at ﬁrst glance, appears reasonably straightforward. So long as the requisite
124 See Associated Press, ‘Robotic Arm Man Christian Kandlbauer Dies in Hospital after Crash’ The Guardian
(22 October 2010) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/22/christian-kandlbauer-arm-dies-
crash> accessed 2 October 2017.
125 As well as the tort of negligence this includes and the Medical Device Regulations 2005, this includes a
range of consumer protection legislation, for example, Misrepresentations Act 1967; Trade Descriptions
Act 1968; Consumer Protection Act 1989 (implementing EC Directive 85/374 on Liability for Defective
Products); General Product Safety Regulations 2005; Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and
Additional Charges) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/3134; and Consumer Rights Act 2015.
126 Barﬁeld and Williams (n 122), 3.
127 ss 1–3.
128 ibid.
129 Thanks to one of the anonymous reviewers for prompting further thoughts on this.
130 Our thanks to Imogen Jones for her thoughts on this.
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intent to do harm is present, and causation can be proven, there are no bounds on the
mode of killing for the offence to obtain. Yet, proving causation might be tricky
depending on both the circumstances surrounding death and how easy it is to tie the
hacking to that death. Lesser offences such as involuntary manslaughter might be
even more difﬁcult. Take, for instance, a scenario where a pacemaker is hacked with
the intent to improve its functioning, but instead the person dies. Or consider cases
where persons who utilise the altered source code for their insulin pump die. Here
there is no malicious intent to cause serious harm so a lesser offence than murder
would need to be pursued. A successful prosecution for involuntary manslaughter
would have to demonstrate both causation and that the hacker undertook an objec-
tively dangerous act. The same problems with causation are present here as with mur-
der. But there is also the matter of proving that the hacking was objectively
dangerous. Given the novelty of the question that would be facing the jury in such
cases, they would have to be persuaded that a reasonable person would have thought
the course to action at issue to be dangerous. It is not a given, however, that they
would be so persuaded.
E. Intellectual Property Rights
The prostheses and implants attached to the everyday cyborg incorporate two types
of property rights: those attaching to (i) the tangible object (property in chattels) and
(ii) intangible aspects such as the branding or design of the device, or the software
incorporated in it (intellectual property—principally patents, copyright, design rights,
and trademarks).131 The law treats these as separate interests, and the regimes govern-
ing them are essentially separate. Ordinarily, property rights in chattels protect owners
in their use and control of the physical objects in question, whilst intellectual property
rights (IPRs) pertain to the owners’ interests in the trade secret, invention, or tangible
expression that is embodied in a product.132 In the context of the everyday cyborg,
the hardware components of an implanted medical device or attached prosthesis
might be protected by a series of patents, design rights, and trademarks. And where
devices are capable of running software, this might be subject to copyright.133 What
we will see in this section is that the nature of intellectual property as rights over
intangibles, coupled with the possibility that various IPRs could be attached to goods
and/or embedded aspects of goods, gives rise to several potential difﬁculties.
One important question is who owns, or ought to own, and control the IP in these
devices once they become attached to the person? Do the IPRs remain with their
originators, or do they pass to the persons into whom they are implanted or to whom
131 Note that we often refer to property in chattels as personal property, meaning property in tangible goods.
However, and perhaps somewhat confusingly, IPRs can also be referred to as personal property. See the
Patents Act 1977, s 30(1), the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 90(1), and the Trade Marks Act
1994, s 24(1). Note, however, that some argue that IP does not share enough features with other forms of
property (ie either land or chattels) to be viewed as property properly so-called. See, for example, S Douglas
and B MacFarlane, ‘Deﬁning Property Rights’ in J Penner and H Smith (eds), Philosophical Foundations of
Property Law (Oxford University Press 2013) 219–43, 239.
132 The relevant legislation is as follows: (i) the Patents Act 1977 (1977 Act), (ii) the Trade Marks Act 1994
(iii) Registered Designs Act 1949, and (iv) Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
133 Computer programs, designs for such programmes, and databases are all ‘literary works’ under the
Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, ss 3(1)(a)-(d). See also Barﬁeld and Williams (n 122) 6.
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they are attached? Establishing clarity (which we suggest we do not currently have)
on IPRs in medical devices and prostheses is important for a number of reasons: for
instance, to ascertain the potential downstream control that an IP holder will have as
the device goes through a series of transfers (ordinarily set out in end-user licence
agreements), whether these are to healthcare organisations purchasing the devices or
patients themselves once implanted or attached. It might also be required in order to
ascertain rights to access for the purposes of software upgrades or repair.134
Alternatively, there may be occasions where it is necessary to identify restrictions
(which ﬂow from the IPRs) on what users can do with the devices, particularly with
regard to users modifying software or installing software that is not approved by the
manufacturer of the device. In such scenarios, clarity is also needed on what the manu-
facturer is permitted to do where such modiﬁcations are made. As we saw in the pre-
vious section, this is especially important in the case of medical devices because of the
potential harm that could be suffered by a user if a device malfunctions.
Since the law treats the IP and property rights in the goods in which they are
embodied as separate interests, the sale of these goods does not usually involve trans-
fer of the IPRs to the purchaser.135 An owner can transfer use and control of IP in a
number of ways, each of which entails different proprietary consequences for the orig-
inal holder of the IPRs and those who subsequently come into possession of them.
The detail and requirements (for the legal validity) of the transfers differs depending
on the types of IPRs (i.e. whether they are patents or copyright and so on).136
Broadly, however, IP and rights contained therein can be transferred by assignment
(i.e. voluntary transfer including sale and gratuitous transfers) or by bequest. They
may also be licensed or mortgaged.137 Since assignments of IPRs are distinct legal
transactions that entail certain formalities in order to be valid, and these are not met
by the mere transfer of physical devices,138 purchasers and other users (such as every-
day cyborgs) are restricted in their usage of such devices. Even with a valid licence,
restrictions apply. Usually licensees can use the subject of the IPRs pursuant to a set
of terms and conditions; for example, on the condition that they pay a set fee and a
percentage of royalties to the licensor (the IPR holder). Licensing does not involve the
transfer of ownership. The IPR holder retains ownership of the intellectual property.139
In the case of the everyday cyborg, this becomes problematic on a number of fronts.
The question of the transfer of IPRs takes on a new signiﬁcance when it comes to
this assemblage of integrated persons and integrated goods. To wit, the transfer of a
prosthesis or implant, which embodies components that are subject to patent, design,
and/or copyright law, does not (on the usual operation of IP law) involve the transfer
134 JR Carvalko, ‘Law and Policy in an Era of Cyborg Assisted-Life: The Implications of Interfacing In-The-
Body Technologies to the Outer World’ (2013) Technology and Society IEEE International Symposium 1, 6.
135 D Bainbridge, Intellectual Property (9th edn, Pearson Education Ltd 2012) 12; Carvalko (n 134) 6.
136 For an in-depth discussion of the modes of transfer for different types of IPRs, see M Smith and N Leslie,
The Law of Assignment (2nd edn, OUP 2013) 451–70.
137 Patents Act 1977, s 30, Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 90, and Trade Marks Act 1994, s 24.
138 Cooper v Stephens [1895] 1 Ch 567. For the formalities relating to an assignment of copyright, see
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 90 (3); For the formalities relating to assignment of a patent,
see Patents Act 1977, s 30 (6). See also L Bently and B Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (4th edn, OUP
2014) 294.
139 See Bently and Sherman, ibid 644.
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of the IPRs to the purchaser of the device (hospitals, etc) or indeed to the everyday
cyborg once implanted/attached. Given this, parties acquiring such devices, including
everyday cyborgs themselves, will be bound by the restrictions of the IPRs and any
licensing terms and conditions. In terms of embedded software, the use of such soft-
ware is often subject to either an express or implied licence. Frequently, the terms and
conditions of software licences include clauses prohibiting the alteration of the soft-
ware. Equally, where the hardware is subject to a patent, restrictions apply. Although a
person who acquires a patented product might, for instance, repair and modify the
product, they might not be permitted to modify it to the extent that they make the
product anew (thereby, interfering with the patent holder’s exclusive rights over the
product).140
IPR restrictions thus raise a number of as yet unanswered questions for the law.
There are potential implications, in particular, for biohackers such as Dana discussed
in the previous section. For instance, what ought the situation to be if a person alters
the software in their device, thereby undertaking a restricted act and potentially
infringing copyright? What if they modify the device by installing different software,
replacing the original software with some that not been approved by the manufacturer
(so-called jailbreaking)?141 One practice undertaken by manufacturers of e-devices
when uses contravene the terms and conditions is to ‘brick’ devices (render them
non-functional, i.e. as useful as a brick).142 Alternatively, they can withdraw technical
support or refuse to issue updates for software so that a device can no longer function
effectively.143 Such moves would be concerning to say the least in the context of pros-
theses and implanted medical devices. Withdrawing support or updates for medical
devices could have very real (and potentially fatal) consequences for patients. Whilst
remotely deactivating e-devices might be legally permissible ordinarily, in the everyday
cyborg context, we cannot just assume that the usual entitlements of manufacturers
and IPR holders pertain (or at least are enforceable).144
140 See Schutz v Werit [2013] UKSC 16; United Wire v Screen Repair Services [2000] 4 All ER 353 (HL), 358
(Lord Hoffman); British Leyland v Armstrong [1986] RPC 279, 376.
141 See G Ramachandran, ‘Assault and Battery on Property’ (2015) 44 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 253,
256–57. For a brief discussion of jail-breaking with regard to smartphones, see D Mac Sı´thigh, ‘App Law
Within: Rights and Regulation in the Smartphone Age’ (2013) 21 International Journal of Law and
Information Technology 154, 168–70.
142 See, for example, G Corﬁeld ‘DJI’s Spark Drones to be Bricked by September 1 Unless Firmware Updated’
The Register (22 August 2017) <https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/08/22/dji_spark_brick_threat_1_
sep_ﬁrmware_update/> accessed 2 October 2017 and K Collins, ‘HP is Now Letting Consumers Remove
Software that Blocks Third-party Ink Cartridges in its Printers’ (30 September 2016) <https://qz.com/
797489/hp-was-blocking-third-party-ink-cartridges-in-its-printers-but-now-is-relenting/> accessed 2
October 2017.
143 See Ramachandran (n 141). Although dealing with non-medical wearable devices, see also Google, ‘Glass
Terms of Use’ (19 August 2014) <https://www.google.com/glass/termsofuse/> accessed 2 October
2017. Note the provisions under the heading ‘Software and Services’ relating to installing unauthorised soft-
ware and making alterations to the device.
144 It is worth noting that even if the IP in prostheses and implants was transferred to a purchaser by virtue of
the sale of the device, this would not further the everyday cyborg’s case for ownership because the intellec-
tual property will potentially not be assigned to the person to whom the device is attached, that is the every-
day cyborg. This is because in these transactions, the purchaser of the device could be someone other than
the everyday cyborg. For instance, where the device has been obtained through the National Health Service
(NHS) rather than through a private sale, the transaction for the sale of the prosthesis or implant would not
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Running through the kinds of challenges and difﬁculties just set out is the more
fundamental issue of the appropriateness of third-party control over devices, which, in
essence, become integrated with persons. In such cases, (at least unconsented) inter-
ferences would seem to constitute a violation of everyday cyborg bodily integrity and
the control persons are usually granted over their bodies and lives. Yet again, this
throws the conceptual foundations of the law into stark relief, highlighting the chal-
lenge to the subject–object divide and law’s boundary-work that everyday cyborgs
pose.
IV . EVERYDAY CYBORGS & LAW’S BOUNDARY-WORK:
CONCEPTUAL AND NORMATIVE CHALLENGES
As we noted near the beginning of this article, in general, the types of challenges we
have indicated arise because of: (i) the transgression of the bodily boundary, (ii) the
integration of the technologies with persons, (iii) the linking of the biological with
synthetic materialities, and (iv) the nature of the technologies as integrated goods.
The conceptual problem at the root of much of this is that the law considers that
something is either a person (subject) or a thing (object). In this respect, the law
engages in clear boundary-work; that is, it constructs a bright line boundary between
person and thing which is foundational to its entire approach. Consequently, this sub-
ject–object dichotomy determines law’s structure, as well as practical matters such as
the offences and remedial routes available. Throughout this article we have seen how
this binary plays out in relation to a number of everyday cyborg-related challenges.
We have also seen the pressure that the assemblage of integrated persons and inte-
grated goods puts on such divisions. First, it is evident in the relevant medical device
law and regulation, where it is clear that these are constructed as law’s ‘objects’.
Secondly, the dichotomy was apparent when considering how the law could, or ought
to, deal with damage to AIMDs. Thirdly, in relation to data, we saw that the increasing
sophistication of medical devices and their interactions/integration with persons call
into question divides which could be drawn between data types (something that is
sometimes used to justify differential control over such data). This aspect was again
highlighted in relation to biohacking where we note that the liabilities which ﬂow
from any harm done would likely follow either subject- or object-focused pathways
(as distinguished from alternative or hybrid solutions).
Before drawing this article to a close, it is worth examining the subject–object
dichotomy further. In so doing, we posit that the subject–object dichotomy closely
involve the everyday cyborg. Rather it would be between the supplier of the device and the NHS, with the
NHS being the purchaser of the device. An argument could be made that the NHS would be acting as an
agent on behalf of the everyday cyborg because the payment that would be made in any sale transaction will
come from the public purse, and therefore from the everyday cyborg through the payment of taxes, and
National Insurance contributions, if he or she is in employment. However, while there might be some merit
in this argument, the point remains that the contract for the sale of the prosthesis or implant will be between
the supplier of the device, and the NHS, rather than between the supplier of the device, and the everyday
cyborg. Of course, this difﬁculty will not arise if the device is obtained through a private sale where the
everyday cyborg makes a payment in exchange for the device. However, the existence of an NHS that is free
at the point of delivery in the UK, and which offers a range of prostheses and implants as treatment for a
number of conditions presumably means that in the UK at least many of these devices will have been, and
are acquired through the NHS, rather than through private sales.
Integrated Persons and Integrated Goods • 27
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/medlaw/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/medlaw/fwy003/4903014
by guest
on 21 March 2018
parallels at least two other dichotomies for the law; speciﬁcally ones which draw lines
between the internal and external and the biological and synthetic. These divisions
highlight the challenges which everyday cyborgs and their technologies pose to exist-
ing legal ontologies (perceived realities which get built into law’s structure and opera-
tion)145 and thus to law’s boundary-work. By boundary-work, we mean how the law
utilises and incorporates supposed ontological and moral boundaries, something
which inﬂuences not only its approach to speciﬁc problems, but also its underlying
structure. To illustrate, consider the transgression of the bodily boundary represented
by much everyday cyborg technology. This is crucially important in terms of under-
standing the challenges for the law. The bodily boundary seemingly marks out the
person from the external world and, as such, it is often the mode by which the sub-
ject–object dichotomy is given effect in particular laws (e.g. damage to property versus
assault and battery). As one of us has argued elsewhere, the subject–object boundary
is taken to be an ontological one (i.e. an empirical reality). This is then imbued with a
moral signiﬁcance that we ﬁnd reﬂected in law’s structure and operative rules.146
Our use of ‘boundary-work’ here draws on discussions from science and technol-
ogy studies. Originally, Gieryn employed the term to draw attention to and analyse
how experts, organisations, and other actors delineate science from non-science.147 In
so doing, they cross, erect, or erase boundaries in order to legitimise their knowledge
and claims or to delegitimise the knowledge and claims of others.148 Boundary-work
has also been used to discuss how scientists engage in boundary-work which is ‘about
drawing boundaries between what is ethically preferable’.149 On the whole where the
concept has been employed in legal scholarship, it has been done with this focus on
the science/non-science boundary and how science is used as a legitimator for (lack
of) regulatory activity in particular areas.150 Recently, it has also been used to examine
how the idea of liminality (the spaces ‘in-between’) can address the problems wrought
by different kinds of boundary-work in health research regulation.151 As Taylor-
Alexander and colleagues note in their exploration of this, for law and regulation
sometimes ‘a focus on margins is not very helpful’, especially in situations where
boundaries move and change.152 This is something that comes to the fore in a very
literal sense in the everyday cyborg context.
145 This use of the phrase ‘legal ontologies’ is to be distinguished from its use at the interface of law and com-
puter science where it means ‘a vocabulary and set of rules for constructing assertions’ (D Rubin, ‘How
Legal Robot Works: Legal Ontologies’ <https://www.legalrobot.com/blog/2016/05/25/Ontologies/>
accessed 2 October 2017.
146 Quigley (n 51) 242–55.
147 TF Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science (University of Chicago Press 1999) 27; TF Gieryn, ‘Boundary-
Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies
of Scientists’ (1983) 48 American Sociological Review 781; M Lamont and V Molnar, ‘The Study of
Boundaries in the Social Sciences’ (2002) 28 Annual Review of Sociology 167.
148 Lamont and Molnar, ibid 179.
149 SP Wainwright and others, ‘Ethical Boundary-Work in the Embryonic Stem Cell Laboratory’ (2006) 28
Sociology of Health and Illness 732, 739.
150 See, for example, S Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisors as Policymakers (Harvard UP 1990).
151 S Taylor-Alexander and others, ‘Beyond Regulatory Compression: Confronting the Liminal Spaces of
Health Research Regulation’ (2016) 8 Law, Innovation, and Technology 149, 170–72.
152 ibid 172.
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Our usage of the term to reveal and analyse challenges regarding the law and every-
day cyborgs looks beyond discussions of the borders between science and
non-science. This is important, because there are a range of ontological, epistemic,
and moral claims which shape the law and get built into its structure—often becom-
ing accepted as immutable realities. In this respect, our usage has resonances both
with Brownsword and Goodwin’s discussion of ‘boundary-marking concepts’ and
with Faulkner’s analysis of boundaries between (types of) medical devices and
between the materials they are composed of. For Brownsword and Goodwin ‘boun-
dary-marking concepts’ indicates how ideas such as human dignity, harm, equality,
and so on inﬂuence people’s decision-making regarding whether or not the regulation
of particular technologies is legitimate.153 Meanwhile Faulkner’s focus on boundaries
between types of devices (and their materials) demonstrates how these are utilised to
(re)draw legal, regulatory, and governance boundaries.154
Utilising the concept of boundary-work more broadly draws our attention to a
wide variety of (types of) claims and prompts us to unpick the claims themselves and
the process of how they came to be embedded in law.155 Importantly, it can also help
us to understand what matters for the law. For instance, it is clear that location matters
for the law; that is, the question of internal versus external. At ﬁrst glance, the
internal-external axis seems like an adequate and pragmatic division around which the
law gives effect to via its various rules. However, there are a couple of difﬁculties with
this. First, the bodily boundary itself, and hence the subject–object boundary, is not
ﬁxed in the biotechnological world. The everyday cyborg is a stark manifestation of
this. Indeed a brief survey of devices quickly reveals the lack of ﬁxity that exists with
regard to location and the bodily boundary. Devices might be completely external
(e.g. simple limb prostheses) or completely internal (e.g. knee replacements or inter-
nal pacemakers). They may also occupy some sort of intermediate category and be
partially internal and partially external, such as is the case with external pacemakers.
With these, the pacemaker itself is located outside of the body, but the pacing wires
(through which the device’s electrical impulses are delivered to regulate the heart’s
rhythm) penetrate the skin and travel through the blood vessels to the heart cham-
bers.156 Moreover, what becomes internal may once again become external; for
153 R Brownsword and M Goodwin, Law and the Technologies of the Twenty-Frist Century (CUP 2010) 187–
224.
154 A Faulkner, Medical Technology into Healthcare and Society: A Sociology of Devices, Innovation and Governance
(Palgrave MacMillan 2009).
155 This usage of boundary-work should, however, be differentiated from both ‘boundary objects’ and ‘bounded
objects’. The former are objects which mediate between different social communities, in which there may
be both shared and divergent understandings of the object (SL Star and JR Griesemer, ‘Institutional
Ecology, “Translations” and Boundary Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley’s Museum of
Vertebrate Zoology, 1907-39’ (1989) 19 Social Studies of Science 387; GC Bowker and SL Star, Sorting
Things Out: Classiﬁcation and Its Consequences (MIT Press 2000); SL Star, ‘This is Not a Boundary Object:
Reﬂections on the Origin of a Concept’ (2010) 35 Science, Technology, and Human Values 601; and NJ
Fox, ‘Boundary Objects, Social Meanings and the Success of New Technologies’ (2011) 45 Sociology 70).
The latter has been used to describe the bounded regulatory categories that the law creates with regard to
certain ‘objects’: tissue, data, embryos, and so on (see Taylor-Alexander and others (n 151) 160).
156 Other devices such as external insulin pumps could be viewed as both wearable and penetrable—these are
externally worn devices, but the needles that deliver the insulin pierce the skin. As Haddow and others put
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instance, a faulty device that needs to be replaced. The bodily boundary is thus
unmade and remade as objects breach the skin and pass in and out of the body.
As Taylor has observed, there is a ‘tendency to presume, rather than ask, what a
body is and where its signiﬁcant boundaries are located’.157 This presumptive ten-
dency is evident in the boundaries constructed within the law. And it is this which
leads directly to the second difﬁculty. For the law, problems arise when that which
was once external becomes (at least partially) internal.158 Whilst the law is structurally
divided into branches relating to persons and branches relating to things, as put by
Brownsword, Scotford, and Yeung, ‘technological innovation . . . puts pressure on
traditional legal concepts (of “property”, “patentability”, “consent”, and so on)’.159
This is no less true of everyday cyborgs. This was particularly clear in the discussion
around damage and liability earlier in the article. Here we saw that law’s need to cate-
gorise (e.g. as property or personal injury) ﬁxes the ‘things’ at issue as either subjects
or objects. The consequence of this is that law’s structure and underlying conceptual
framework is challenged by everyday cyborg technologies.
However, the challenge which devices present in this respect is not simply about
location (internal-external) or the (transgression of the) bodily boundary crudely
understood. Crucially, it is about the level of integration with or dependency of per-
sons in relation to devices. As stated earlier everyday cyborgs are integrated persons.
They are the literal integration of persons and things. Devices become incorporated
into persons along multiple dimensions, including the physical, functional, psychologi-
cal (becoming part of their lives and identities), and phenomenological (becoming
part of how they live and experience the device and the world).160 Of these, the most
direct pressure on the law and law’s foundations comes from the physical and func-
tional aspects of integration/dependence.
Parts and devices become physically incorporated into or integrated with persons
to greater or lesser degrees. Some such as simple prosthetic devices and some wear-
able technologies are straightforwardly attached to persons. The bodily skin is not
broken, although they do become extensions of the body itself; for instance, an aes-
thetic arm prosthesis. Other wearables such as external insulin pumps more explicitly
transgress the bodily boundary. These pumps have a needle that is inserted under the
skin. Meanwhile, hip and knee replacements, as well as implanted devices such as
ICDs or pacemakers, are completely internalised. These have a higher level of physical
integration with persons. For some devices this also brings with it a higher level of
dependency of persons on the device. This relates to functional integration. Some
devices have a mere aesthetic function, such as simple limb prostheses. Others have a
simple mechanical one. Joint replacements, for example, are aimed at mimicking the
movement and function of the natural joint. Yet other devices can be seen in relation
it, ‘these technologies are performing not only for us, but also on us and within us, chipping away at the inac-
cessibility of our internal bodies’. Haddow, Harmon and Gilman (n 5) 211.
157 JS Taylor, ‘Surfacing the Body Interior’ (2005) 34 Annual Review of Anthropology 741, 749.
158 Analogous problems arise for biomaterials that go the other way, from the body to the external world.
159 R Brownsword, E Scotford and K Yeung, ‘Law, Regulation, and Technology: The Field, Frame, and Focal
Questions’ in R Brownsword, E Scotford and K Yeung (eds), Oxford Handbook of the Law and Regulation of
Technology (OUP 2017) 3–38, 3.
160 Quigley (n 51) 251–55.
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to some sort of monitoring, regulatory, or interventionist functioning; or indeed some
combination of these—both internal and externally worn insulin pumps monitor a
person’s blood glucose, analysing and then delivering their insulin requirements.
Thus, the greater the physical integration with persons, the greater support or
replacement of bodily functioning, or the greater the dependency of persons on the
devices, the more the subject–object dichotomy blurs and breaks down. Signiﬁcantly,
any such division is completely eliminated in the case of devices which keep persons
alive. Pacemakers, for example, continually monitor and regulate a person’s heart
rhythm. ICDs do this too, but can also deliver an electric shock if needed. These devi-
ces can literally be the difference between life and death. As such, they become con-
stitutive of the everyday cyborg’s subjecthood.161
The blurring of the subject–object dichotomy maps closely onto another divide—
that between the biological and the artiﬁcial. Often the biological is more closely asso-
ciated with subjects and the synthetic with objects. Consider again the discussion in
Section III of the construction medical devices as law’s objects. There we argued that
various regulatory and legal instruments construct medical devices as different types
of ‘objects’—risk objects, marketised objects, innovation objects, and so on. Arguably,
underlying all of these is an understanding of these objects as artiﬁcial, and, as such,
set apart from the biological. Here we can view materials and materiality as being sig-
niﬁcant for understanding the law’s approach. This is underscored if we think about
the simple fact that we have different legislation governing the synthetic and the bio-
logical—the Medical Devices Regulations 2002 (and now the MDR and IVDR) for
artiﬁcial devices versus the Human Tissue Acts,162 Human Transplantation (Wales)
Act 2013, and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (as amended 2008)
for various biomaterials. Even within the category of ‘biological’ we can see there is
marked boundary-work taking place, most noticeably that which delineates reproduc-
tive from other tissues. Thus, for the law it is clear that the types of materials at issue
matter. But it is not just that ‘matter matters’;163 that is, whether it is important that
the materials themselves are biological or synthetic. The process of mattering—how
material comes to matter—is signiﬁcant.164
Sørensen observes that materiality is a frequent preoccupation of science and tech-
nology studies, yet it is rarely deﬁned.165 Some use it to refer ‘to the “physical” aspects
of entities or simply to anything “non-human”’.166 For others, materiality is relational,
about the interrelationship between the material and the social.167 Inﬂuenced by this
latter understanding, we use it here to draw attention to relationality and process
regarding everyday cyborgs and the law.168 Hence, when we say that challenges arise
161 ibid 252.
162 Human Tissue Act 2004 (England, Wales, and NI) and Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006.
163 J Law, ‘The Materials of STS’ in D Hicks and MC Beaudry (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Material Culture
Studies (OUP 2010) 173–88, 173.
164 ibid.
165 E Sørensen, ‘The Time of Materiality’ (2007) 8, Art 2 Forum: Qualitative Social Research 3.
166 ibid.
167 ibid 4, referring to the work of Bruno Latour in particular. See B Latour, We Have Never Been Modern
(Harvester Wheatsheaf 1993).
168 In so doing, we do not purport to adhere to any particular or strict usage of the term. Indeed, as Sørensen
points out, ‘neither Latour [from whom relational/agency accounts have their antecedence] nor STS
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because of the linking of the biological with synthetic materialities, we do so to high-
light not only that materials (i.e. biological or synthetic) matter for law and law’s
approach, but this mattering occurs as part of particular contexts, processes, and rela-
tions. For everyday cyborg technologies, and indeed everyday cyborgs themselves, the
interrelationship is not only between the materials and the social, but also the legal,
the conceptual, and the normative. It is through these that the everyday cyborg and
their technologies come to ‘matter’ to the law, and in virtue of which the law takes
one approach rather than another. For the law, the question of what matters (and
how) when it comes to technologies is one which traditionally delineates persons
from things along multiple dimensions (subject–object, internal–external, biological–
synthetic). Yet the everyday cyborg’s very existence puts pressure on law’s boundary-
work here, being—as they are—the living embodiment of the linking of the biological
with synthetic–technological materialities.
When we talk about materialities (as opposed to simply materials), it serves to
remind us that a number of the challenges we have pointed to in this article arise not
in virtue of material objects, but because of the immaterial. The immaterial can be
understood in terms of contexts, processes, and relations as just mentioned, but also
in terms of the immaterial (aspects of) technologies (software, data, and wireless com-
munication). The discussion at various points in Section III highlighted the fact that
the law does not have an integrated approach for dealing with integrated goods, let
alone the further integration of these with persons; for instance, how to think about
IPRs once their ‘object’ is in the body, or whether data on device functioning ought to
be treated all that differently from physiological data about organ functioning
(e.g. heart versus pacemaker) in such circumstances. Here again maintaining an
object-focused law, and thus simply applying existing law regarding non-person
integrated technologies, may not be satisfactory. It may lead us to neglect more
subject-orientated concerns, such as issues of process and transformation highlighted
in Section III, or issues of third-party bodily control where IPRs remain with their
originator. If this is correct, then we may need to ﬁnd ways to surmount yet another
boundary which the law gives life to: that between the material and immaterial.
V. CONCLUSION
A key challenge, as noted in Halsbury’s Laws of England in relation to computer sys-
tems generally, is that ‘a legal system focusing on issues of ownership, control and use
of physical objects must re-orientate itself to suit the requirements of an information
society and the new worlds of cyberspace’.169 The rise of the everyday cyborg means
that the law must re-orientate itself yet again. It must not only meet the needs of the
new world of cyberspace, but those of the assemblage of integrated persons and inte-
grated goods. Everyday cyborg technologies can be viewed as disruptive, not only to
the practical approach of the law, but with respect to its conceptual and normative
underpinnings.170 Given this, unless the law evolves, it is going to struggle to
scholars in general occupied with materiality dwell on the efforts to formulate a clear deﬁnition of material-
ity’; Sørensen (n 165).
169 Halsbury’s Laws of England (2012) vol 57, para 502.
170 For an in-depth discussion of three modes of disruption posed by technology in general, see Brownsword,
Scotford and Yeung (n 159)
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adequately and justiﬁably deal with the challenges wrought by advancing technology
generally, and those of the assemblage of integrated persons and integrated good in
particular. Exactly what the shape of the law should be in this respect remains to be
explored and debated. Nevertheless, it is only by confronting everyday cyborgs and
their technologies head on that we can better understand the challenges for the law
and, more importantly, begin to imagine alternative legal futures for dealing with
them.
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